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In our present paper, we have explored the possibilities and developed arguments for 
an application of principles of neutrosophic game theory as a generalization of the 
fuzzy game theory model to a better understanding of the Israel-Palestine problem in 
terms of the goals and governing strategies of either side. We build on an earlier 
attempted justification of a game theoretic explanation of this problem by Yakir 
Plessner (2001) and go on to argue in favour of  a  neutrosophic adaptation of the 





Israel-Palestine conflict, Oslo Agreement, fuzzy games, neutrosophic semantic space  
 
 
Document converted by PDFMoto freeware versionBackground 
 
There have been quite a few academic exercises to model the ongoing Israel-Palestine 
crisis using principles of statistical game theory. However, though the optimal 
solution is ideally sought in the identification of a Nash equilibrium in a cooperative 
game, the true picture is closer to a zero-sum game rather than a cooperative one. In 
fact it is not even a zero-sum game at all times, as increasing levels of mutual 
animosity in the minds of the players often pushes it closer to a sub-zero sum game. 
(Plessner, 2001). 
 
As  was  rightly pointed out by Plessner (2001), the application of game  theory 
methodology to the current conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is based on 
identifying the options that each party has, and an attempt to evaluate, based on the 
chosen option, what each of them is trying to achieve. The Oslo Agreement is used as 
an instance with PLO leadership being left to choose between two mutually exclusive 
options: either compliance with the agreement or non-compliance. Plessner contended 
that given the options available to PLO leadership as per the Oslo Agreement, the 
following are the five possible explanations for its conduct: 
 
•  The PLO leadership acts irrationally; 
 
•  Even though the PLO  leadership  wants peace and desires to comply, it  is 
unable to do so because of mounting internal pressures; 
 
•  PLO leadership wants peace but is unwilling to pay the internal political price 
that any form of compliance shall entail; 
 
•  PLO leadership wants to keep the conflict going, and believes that Israel is so 
weak that it does not have to bear the internal political price of compliance, 
and can still achieve his objectives; or 
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overtly or covertly, it is merely trying to extract a better final agreement than 
the one achievable without violence 
 
Plessner (2001) further argued that the main objective of the players is not limited to 
territorial concessions but rather concerns the recognition of Palestinian sovereignty 
over Temple Mount and the right of return of Palestinian refugees to pre-1967 Israel; 
within the territorial boundaries drawn at the time of the 1949 Armistice Agreements.  
 
However, a typical complication in a problem of this kind is that neither the principal 
objective nor the strategy vectors remain temporally static. That is, the players’ goals 
and strategies change over time making the payoff matrix a dynamic one. So, the 
same players under a similar set-up are sometimes found engaging in cooperative 
games and at other times in non-cooperative ones purely depending on their 
governing strategy vectors and principal objective at any particular point of time. For 
example, the PLO leadership may have bargained for a better final agreement using 
pressure tactics based on violence in the pre 9/11 scenario when the world had not yet 
woken up fully to the horrors of global terrorism and he perceived that the Israel was 
more likely to make territorial concessions in exchange of lasting peace. However, in 
the post 9/11 scenario, with the global opinion strongly united against any form of 
terrorism, its governing strategy vector will have to change as Israel now not only will 
stone-wall the pressure tactics, but will also enjoy more liberty to go on the offensive.   
 
Moreover, besides being temporally unstable, the objectives and strategies are often 
ill-defined, inconsistent and have a lot of interpretational ambiguity. For example, 
while a strategy for the PLO leadership could appear to be keeping the conflict alive 
with the covert objective of maintaining its own organizational significance in the 
Arabian geopolitics, at the same time there would definitely have to be some actions 
from its side which would convey a clear message to the other side that it wants to 
end the conflict – which apparently has been its overt objective, which would then get 
Israel to reciprocate its overt intentions. But in doing so, Israel could gain an upper 
hand at the bargaining table, which would again cause internal pressures to mount on 
PLO leadership thereby jeopardising the very position of power it is seen trying to 
preserve by keeping the conflict alive.  
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                                                               Palestine 
                                               I                                        II 
                       
                    I  
 Israel         II 
                    III 
                    IV 
 
 
Palestine’s strategy vector: (I – full compliance with Oslo Agreement, II – partial or 
non-compliance) 
 
Israel’s strategy vector: (I - make territorial concessions, II - accept right of return of 
the Palestinian refugees, III –  launch an all-out  military campaign, IV – continue 
stone-walling) 
 
The payoff matrix has been constructed with reference to the row player i.e. Israel. In 
formulating the payoff matrix it is assumed that combination (I, I) will potentially end 
the conflict while combination (IV, II) will basically mean a status quo  with 
continuing conflict. If Palestine can get Israel to either make territorial concessions or 
accept the right of return of Palestinian refugees without fully complying with the 
Oslo Agreement i.e. strategy combinations (I, II) and (II, II), then it marks a gain for 
the former and a loss for the latter. If Israel accepts the right of return of Palestinian 
refugees and Palestine agrees to fully comply with the Oslo Agreement, then though it 
would potentially end the conflict, it could possibly be putting the idea of an 
independent Jewish state into jeopardy and so the strategy combination (II, I) does not 
have a positive payoff for Israel. If Israel launches an all-out military campaign and 
forces Palestine into complying with the Oslo Agreement i.e. strategy combination 
(III, I) then it would not result in an exactly positive payoff for Israel due to possible 
alienation of world opinion and may be even losing some of the U. S. backing. If an 
1  -1 
0  -1 
0  -1 
1   0 
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will definitely result in a negative payoff due to increased violence and bloodshed. If 
however, there is a sudden change of heart within the Palestinian leadership and 
Palestine chooses to fully abide by the Oslo Agreement without any significant 
corresponding territorial or political consideration by Israel i.e. strategy combination 
(IV, I), it will result in a potential end to the conflict with a positive payoff for Israel. 
 
In the payoff matrix, the last row dominates the first three rows while the second 
column dominates the first column. Therefore the above game has a saddle point for 
the strategy combination (IV, II) which shows that in their attempt to out-bargain each 
other both parties will actually end up continuing the conflict indefinitely!  
 
It is clear that Palestine on its part will not want to ever agree to have full compliance 
with the Oslo Agreement as it will see always see itself worse off that way. Given that 
Palestine will never actually comply fully with the Oslo Agreement, Israel will see in 
its best interest to continue the status quo with an ongoing conflict, as it will see itself 
ending up on the worse end of the bargain if it chooses to play any other strategy.  
 
The equilibrium solution as we have obtained here is more or less in concurrence with 
the conclusion reached by Plessner. He argued that given the existing information at 
Israel's disposal, it is impossible to tell whether  PLO leadership chooses non-
compliance because it will have to pay a high internal political price otherwise or 
because it may want to keep the conflict alive just to wear down the other side thereby 
opening up the possibility of securing greater bargaining power at the negotiating 
table. The point Plessner sought to make is that whether or not PLO leadership truly 
wants peace is immaterial because in any case it will act in order to postpone a final 
agreement, increase its weight in the international political arena and also try to gain 
further concessions from Israel. 
 
Case for applying neutrosophic game theory 
 
However, as is quite evident, none of the strategy vectors available to either side will 
remain temporally stationary as crucial events keep unfolding on the global political 
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is a lot of ambiguity about the driving motives behind PLO leadership’s primary goal 
and the strategies it adopts to achieve that goal. Also it is hard to tell apart a true 
bargaining strategy from one just meant to be a political decoy. This is where we 
believe and advocate an application of the conceptual framework of the neutrosophic 
game theory as a generalization of the dynamic fuzzy game paradigm. 
 
  In generalized terms, a well-specified  dynamic  game at time t is a particular 
interaction ensemble with well defined rules and roles for the players within the 
ensemble, which remain in place at time t but are allowed to change over time. 
However, the players often may suffer from what is termed in organizational 
psychology as “role ambiguity” i.e. a situation where none of the players are exactly 
sure what to expect from the others or what the other players expect from them. In the 
context of the Israel-Palestine problem, for example, PLO leadership would probably 
not have been sure of its exact role when Yasser Arafat met with U.S. and Israeli 
leadership at the Camp David Summit ostensibly to hammer out a peace agreement. 
Again following Plessner’s argument, Arafat went to that Summit against his free will 
and would have liked to avoid Camp David if he could because he did not want to 
sign any final agreement that was short of a complete renunciation of its sovereign 
existence by Israel. With no such capitulation forthcoming from Israel, it was in PLO 
leadership’s best interest to keep the conflict alive.  However,  it did have to give 
certain overt indications mainly to keep U.S. satisfied that a negotiated settlement was 
possible and was being preferred over letting loose Hamas mercenaries on the streets.   
Under such circumstances, it would be quite impossible to pick out a distinct 
governing strategy which the other side could then meet with a counter-strategy.  
 
However, one positive aspect about Summits such as the Camp David Summit is that 
they make the game scenario an open one in the sense that the conflicting parties are 
able to dynamically construct and formulate objectives and strategies in the course of 
their  peaceful, mutual interaction within a formally defined socio-political set-up. 
This allows a closer analytical study of the negotiation process where the negotiation 
space may be defined as NPalestine ˙ NIsrael. 
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about what constitutes a “just deal” (Burns and Rowzkowska, 2002). Such views are 
formed based on personal value judgements, past experience and also an expectation 
about the possible best-case and worst-case negotiation outcomes. This fuzzy 
semantic space is open to modifications as negotiations progress and views are 
exchanged resulting in earlier notions being updated in the light of new information.  
 
This semantic space however remains fuzzy due to vagueness about the exact 
objectives and lack of precise understanding of the exact stakes which the opposing 
parties have from their viewpoints. That is to say, none of the conflicting parties can 
effectively put themselves in the shoes of each other and precisely understand each 
other’s nature of expectations.  
 
This is borne out in the Camp David Summit when probably one side of the table was 
thinking in terms of keeping the conflict alive while giving the impression to the other 
side that they were seriously seeking ways to end it. This immediately makes it clear 
why such a negotiation would break down, simply because it never got started in the 
first place! 
 
If the Israel-Palestine problem is formulated as a dynamic fuzzy bargaining game, the 
players’ fuzzy set judgement functions over expected outcomes may be formulated as 
follows according to the well known rules of fuzzy set algebra (Zadeh, 1965): 
 
For Palestine, the fuzzy evaluative judgment function at time t, J (P, t) will be given 
by the fuzzy set membership function M J (P, t) which is expressed as follows: 
 
                                                                c˛ (0.5, 1); for ˆWorst < x < ˆBest 
                                        M J (P, t) (x) =    0.5; for x = ˆWorst; and 
                                                                0; for x £ˆWorst 
 
Here ˆBest is the best possible negotiation outcome Palestine could expect; which, 
according to Plessner, would probably be Israeli recognition of the right of return of 
Palestinian refugees to their pre-1967 domicile status.For Israel on the other hand, the 
fuzzy evaluative judgment function at time t, J (I, t) will be given by the fuzzy set 
membership function M J (I, t) which will be as follows: 
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                                                               1; for y ‡`Best 
                                                                c㡀˛ (0.5, 1); for `Worst < y < `Best 
                                        M J (I, t) (y) =    0.5; for y = `Worst; 
                                                                0; for y £ `Worst 
 
Here  `Worst is the worst possible negotiation outcome Israel could expect; which, 
would concur with the best expected outcome for Palestine.  
 
However, the semantic space NPalestine  ˙  NIsrael  is more generally framed as a 
neutrosophic semantic space which is a three-way generalization of the fuzzy 
semantic space and includes a third, neutral possibility whereby the semantic space 
cannot be de-fuzzified into two crisp zero-one states due to the incorporation of an 
intervening state of “indeterminacy”. Such indeterminacy could practically arise from 
the fact that any mediated, two-way negotiation process is likely to become over-
catalyzed by the subjective utility preferences of the mediator – in case of the Israel-
Palestine problem; that of the U.S. (and to a lesser extent; that of some of the other 
permanent members of the UN Security Council).  
 
Neutrosophy is a new branch of philosophy that is concerned with neutralities and 
their interaction with various ideational spectra (Smarandache, 2000). Let T, I, F be 
real subsets of the non-standard interval ]
-0, 1
+[. If ˛ > 0 is an infinitesimal such that 
for all positive integers n and we have |˛| < 1/n, then the non-standard finite numbers 
1
+ = 1+˛ and 0
- = 0-˛  form the boundaries of the non-standard interval ]
-0, 1
+[. 
Statically, T, I, F are subsets while dynamically, as in our case when we are using the 
model in the context of a dynamic game, they may be viewed as set-valued vector 
functions. If a logical proposition is said to be t% true in T, i% indeterminate in I and 
f% false in F  then  T,  I,  F are referred to as the neutrosophic components. 
Neutrosophic probability is useful to events that are shrouded in a veil of 
indeterminacy like the actualimplied volatility of long-term options. As this approach 
uses a subset-approximation  for truth values, indeterminacy and falsity-values it 
provides a better approximation than classical probability to uncertain events. 
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(P, t) will be given by the neutrosophic set membership function M JN (P, t) which may 
be expressed as follows: 
 
                                                               c˛ (0.5, 1); for ˆWorst < x < ˆBest AND x ˛ T 
                                        M JN (P, t) (x) =  0.5; for x = ˆWorst AND x ˛ T 
                                                               0; for x £ˆWorst AND x ˛ T 
 
For Israel on the other hand, the neutrosophic evaluative judgment function at time t, 
JN (I, t) will be given by the neutrosophic set membership function M JN (I, t) which 
may be expressed as follows: 
                                                                             
                                                              1; for y ‡`Best AND y ˛ F 
                                                              c㡀˛ (0.5, 1); for `Worst < y < `Best AND y ˛ F 
                                        M JN (I, t) (y) =  0.5; for y = `Worst AND y ˛ F; 
                                                              0; for y £ `Worst AND y ˛ F 
 
 
Pertaining to the three-way classification of neutrosophic semantic space, it is t% true 
in sub-space  T that a mediated, bilateral negotiation will produce a  favourable 
outcome within the evaluative judgment space of the Palestinian leadership while it is 
f% false in sub-space F that the outcome will be favourable within the evaluative 
judgment space of the Palestinian leadership.  However there is an i% indeterminacy 
in sub-space I whereby the nature of the outcome may be neither favourable nor 
unfavourable within the evaluative judgment space of either competitor – for example 




M JN (P, t) (x) {or M JN (I, t) (y)} would be interpreted as Palestine’s (or Israel’s) degree of 
satisfaction with the negotiated settlement. Following Plessner’s argument again, it is 
PLO leadership’s ultimate objective to see the end of an independent Jewish state of 
Israel and if that be the case then of course there will always be an unbridgeable 
incongruence between M JN (P, t) (x) and M JN (I, t) (y) because of mutually inconsistent 
evaluative judgment spaces between the two parties to the conflict. Therefore, for any 
form of negotiation to have a positive result the first and foremost requirement would 
be to make the evaluative judgment spaces consistent. Because unless the evaluative 
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the very onset of the bargaining process thereby pre-empting any equilibrium solution 
different from the status quo. However, by its very definition, since these spaces are 
not crisp, they are malleable to some extent (Reiter, 1980). That is, even while 
retaining their core forms, subtle changes could be induced to make these spaces 
workably consistent. Then the aim of the mediator should to make the parties redefine 
their primary objectives without necessarily feeling that such redefinition itself means 
a concession. When this required redefinition of primary objectives has been achieved 
can the evaluative judgment spaces generate a negotiation space that will not become 
null  ab initio.  However, there is also  an indeterminate aspect to any process of 
mediated bilateral dialogues between the two parties due to the catalyzation effect 
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